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Lessons Learned Among the three issues have emerged repeatedly in the preceding analysis of the failure of the UNESCO Culture of Peace Programme, the three primary difficulties come from resistance by the nation-state, lack of funding priorities for peace-building; and unworkable bureaucracy. The resistance of the nation-state is perhaps the most important problem. Within the UN system, there is little recourse against government resistance since the policies of inter-governmental organizations like those of the UN system are determined by the Member States, and they tend to support each other in case of a dispute. National culture of peace programmes can only be undertaken with agreement of the state concerned, agreement which was granted in the cases of El Salvador and Mozambique. However, when government policy became an obstacle to further progress in such a programme, which has been described in case of these two countries, there is no possibility of appeal to a higher body and no recourse but to accept the government decisions, even if it means seriously weakening the programme. Given that the nation-state itself has historically been shaped by the culture of war, it is not surprising that states would resist a culture of peace. After all, according to some accounts the nation-state originated as an institution to monopolize the forces of war in a society, and in any case the culture of war has long been one of its defining characteristics. In addition to its monopoly of violence, the state embodies all of the other features of the culture of war: it is hierarchically organized, it defends privilege and wealth, it defines the "enemy", it maintains information secret in the name of "national security", and, for the most part, it is under macho, male control. In 1992, when the culture of peace programme was instituted, there were a number of "failed states" in which there was no central government in a position to resist the establishment of national culture of peace programmes. Instead, the state was reconstituted as a compromise formation in which the UN mediated among two or more opposing forces who were competing for power. Thus, culture of peace programmes could be established as extensions of UN peacekeeping operations in El Salvador and Mozambique, and in that context it was possible to insist that they should be characterized by cooperation between the opposition forces, government and FMLN in El Salvador and FRELIMO and RENAMO in Mozambique. In Burundi and Somalia, where we launched the other national programmes, the situations were analogous, although differing in detail. However, once these "failed states" hold national elections and establish new governments, it becomes increasingly difficult for the culture of peace programmes to count on cooperation of the government with the opposition forces. An argument can be made that the rush to elections following peacekeeping operations has been too rapid and that the UN should have retained a strong role as mediator for a longer period of time in order to establish peace in a country. However, it would appear that the original intention of the UN with its peacekeeping operations was not so much to establish peace on a long-term basis, but rather to reinstitute the traditional structure of the state as soon as possible. It is not surprising that a culture of peace, for the member states of the UN system, seems to be less important than state power. This affects the availability of funding for a culture of peace. If development aid is to be effective, it must provide development for all, not just for a ruling elite. However, the priority given by the UN and its member states to strong central government shows up in the decision-making process on development aid to poor countries. Decisions on UN development aid are made according to a "country plan" in which the privileged partner is the government itself; while there is no particular role for the civil society and especially no insistence on involvement of opposition forces. Thus, UN development aid goes to strengthen the state and its monopoly of power, and, as a result, is particularly susceptible to corruption. Culture of peace programmes, on the other hand, insist on the development of a consensus plan involving all of the major forces in a country. What is perhaps most devastating for peace are the contracts for military weapons made by the industrial countries of the North with the developing nations of the South. The development aid programmes of the UN and the balance of payments deals made by the World Bank (technically a member of the UN system) help support the ability of the developing countries to buy weapons from the major weapons producing countries, which include not only the US, France, UK and Russia, but even the "peaceful" countries of Scandinavia. The need to continue these lucrative deals on a stable, long-term basis provides a vested interested in the Northern countries to support strong central governments in the South which maintain existing relations of power and wealth. The preceding analysis helps explain why there was very little funding for peace-building in general and culture of peace programmes in particular, especially when compared to the large-scale funding for peace-keeping operations. There was rhetoric by the United Nations secretariat in favour of peace-building, especially in the documents of the UNDP Human Development Reports and the document An Agenda for Development. However, there was never the commitment of the needed funds by the member states. In general, the purpose of peace-keeping operations was not to build peace, but to restore the state's monopoly of power and violence as quickly as possible in those countries where it had broken down. The rush to elections may be seen as a part of this strategy. In contrast, the funding of peacekeeping operations has been enormous because it was used to justify and perpetuate the culture of war. While funds for peace-building were minimal, funds for peacekeeping operations were valued at billions of dollars, consisting largely of military personnel and equipment loaned to the operations in question rather than hard cash contributions. In fact, the use of their military resources for peacekeeping helped the member states justify excessive military budgets to their own sceptical constituents who demand social services instead of military spending. The use of peace-keeping to justify and perpetuate the culture of war has even found a place in the culture of peace programme at UNESCO. Influenced by certain advisors, the Director-General has sponsored a number of meetings that bring together military leaders to discuss how they can contribute to peace-keeping and peaceful uses of the military. These meetings, held in the name of the culture of peace, have not questioned the change the primary tasks of the military - which are still the use of violence - but have helped to give the military a better image in an era where violence is ever more called into question. In this analysis, I have spent a lot of time on bureaucratic problems, but if there were political will and resources, these could have been overcome. We could have begun by implementing the 1992 proposal for the culture of peace programme in UNESCO document 149Ex/28: a new institution with staff on loan from other institutions (instead of a permanent bureaucracy) and financed by a fixed proportion of peacekeeping funds. Based on more recent experience, one should also add some other features such a system of conflict resolution within the institution itself and an information system for the full sharing of information both within the institution and with external partners. And finally, there would need to be both a decentralization of programmes and a way to change personnel at the local level if they become obstacles to its development. |